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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T] here are literally hundreds of thousands of old, ne-
glected industrial sites now popularly called 'brownfields,'
that can be redeveloped .... Protecting our environment
in the urban area can go hand-in-hand with redevelop-
ment. It can create jobs and at the same time make more
people want to live in the cities of America again."1
&popular anecdote, discussed in dispute resolution circles, de-
picts two parties arguing over a single orange. Both parties
want the entire orange and are unwilling to negotiate a compro-
mise or settle for anything less than the entire orange. In reality,
however, neither party needs the entire orange to achieve its objec-
tive. One party wants only the rind of the orange while the other
party wants only the interior portion of the fruit. It is this misun-
derstanding of positions that, if allowed to proceed, will produce a
windfall for one party and a total loss for the other. Alternatively, if
both parties discuss their objectives, they may come to an under-
standing and achieve a mutually beneficial outcome, thus satisfying
both parties' goals and objectives and resulting in a win-win
situation.
Brownfields development and the recycling of America's urban
wastelands create such a dichotomy of interests. Brownfields devel-
opment has the unusual distinction of uniting varied forces in the
pursuit of the same goal: redevelopment of abandoned or un-
derutilized commercial real estate. This article does not purport to
include all possible parties to a given brownfields redevelopment
transaction; rather, the focus is on discussing two major forces that
consistently cross paths in the quest to revitalize inner city
brownfields.
On one side of the debate is the party who stands to gain eco-
nomically from the development. This group includes, but is not
limited to, private investors, state and local governments, property
1. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President to the White
House Conference on Empowerment Zones (Feb. 22, 1996) (transcript available
in the Federal Document Clearing House).
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owners, and corporate tenants. 2 This group is driven by pecuniary
gain; brownfields development represents the potential for this
group to reap large financial rewards from what usually is a high-
risk venture. Financial gain is broadly defined to include increased
property values, stabilization of local tax revenue bases, decreased
unemployment, and increased developer interest in similarly situ-
ated properties.3 Local governments court developers primarily
through tax incentives, relaxed zoning standards, and other eco-
nomic "plums" that make brownfields development a viable alterna-
tive to less burdened properties. 4
On the other side of the debate is a variety of local community
interests that collectively operate under the umbrella of the Envi-
ronmental Justice movement. This melting pot of interested parties
consists of, but is not limited to, community-based organizations,
youth groups, faith groups, labor groups, civil rights groups, public
health groups, and philanthropic groups.5 This side hopes to bene-
fit from brownfields redevelopment through the creation of jobs,
2. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NEJAC Rep. 500-R-96-
002, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIELDS: THE
SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE (Dec. 1996), available at http://es.epa.gov/
oeca/oej/nejac (visited Feb. 16, 2000) [hereinafter AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE]
(noting importance of private and public sectors working with state and local gov-
ernments to facilitate successful brownfields redevelopment). The National Envi-
ronmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) has advocated that local governments
do not possess the "capacity or resources" to implement effectively any brownfields
redevelopment plan. See id. Thus, local governments must utilize "radically differ-
ent" approaches in order to create a successful brownfields redevelopment project.
See id. Thus, the involvement of the affected community, including citizens and
businesses, is essential. Only they can provide the resources necessary to aid local
governments in crafting solutions to the brownfields problem. See id. (enumerat-
ing various members and motivations of NEJAC).
3. See generally Karen-Lee Ryan, Toxic Turnabouts, PLAN. (Dec. 1, 1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 13739271 (citing examples of brownfields redevelopment projects
that have resulted in financial gain for their respective areas).
4. See Ronald D. Utt, What to do About the Cities, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Sept. 1,
1998, at 1; see also Ryan, supra note 3 (citing economic incentives provided to cities
in return for brownfields redevelopment); AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2
(noting that goal of brownfields redevelopment is "[m]obilizing the community's
assets fully for economic development and information sharing purposes").
5. See AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (noting existence of ever-in-
creasing number of community groups interested in community planning and de-
velopment). Community members want to play a larger role in "mapping" their
communities; people now want a larger say in deciding how their respective com-
munities will be planned in order to create and sustain a healthy and stable envi-
ronment. See id. According to the NEJAC Report, "[a] principal tenet of
community-based planning is the thesis that a community which has a strong sense
of itself is capable of being more self-defined, self-directed, and self-controlled,
and thus more capable of shaping its own future." Id. For a further discussion of
the Environmental Justice movement, see infra notes 55-74 and accompanying
text.
2000]
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revitalization of the local economy, remediation of contaminated
lands, and the reuse of existing commercial inventory.6 The Envi-
ronmental Justice movement defines success in terms of lowered
health risks, reduced environmental burdens, and increased eco-
nomic opportunities. It is not enough that a particular project sim-
ply is built, it must also satisfy the greater health, safety, and
environmental goals of those who will be most affected by its
construction.7
This article poses some questions. Can brownfields develop-
ment provide both economic revitalization and environmental jus-
tice? Or, are the two sides so hopelessly divided that the efforts of
one side will only serve to undermine the efforts of the other?
Through the analysis of successful brownfields developments, gov-
ernmental initiatives, and environmental understanding, this article
will illustrate how an integrated approach to brownfields develop-
ment can achieve the combined goals of all parties through the use
of increased stakeholder involvement, compromise, concessions,
and a redefining of what makes a successful project. A close obser-
vation reveals the similarity of the goals on both sides of the
brownfields debate-economic revitalization of urban areas that
benefits the community as a whole.
Part II of this article discusses the historical and statutory back-
ground of brownfields.8 Part III discusses measures taken by the
federal government and its administrative agencies to create a more
positive image of brownfields redevelopment and to encourage
remediation of brownfields. 9 Part IV discusses the Environmental
Justice movement, and the impact this movement has had on
6. See id. (stating that economic development must directly benefit members
of community).
7. See id. (noting that "efforts must be made to ensure workplace health and
safety for those jobs developed within the community, particularly those associated
with environmental cleanup activities[,] and .. . jobs must produce livable wages
which fit into a career development ladder that is based upon realistic assessment
of present and emerging job markets"). An increase in economic development
must parallel an increase in the community's efforts to achieve higher standards of
health and safety. See id. Increased cooperation throughout the community is es-
sential for this group to achieve its goals. See id.; see also TODD S. DAVIs & KEVIN D.
MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDs: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To REDEVELOPING CONTAMI-
NATED PROPERTY 11 (1997) (emphasizing that remediation of brownfields must
preserve and enhance community's health, safety, and environment).
8. For a discussion of the historical and statutory background of brownfields,
see infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of measures taken by the federal government to create a
more positive image of brownfields redevelopment and remediation, see infra
notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XI: p. I
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redeveloping brownfields.' 0 Part V discusses the benefits that can
emerge from a successful brownfields development by examining a
brownfields redevelopment in Lawndale, Illinois. 1 Part VI takes
the Lawndale case study a step further and discusses how a success-
ful brownfields redevelopment can result in community revitaliza-
tion. 12 Finally, Part VII concludes that early unification and
cooperation among all parties is crucial in the developmental pro-
cess in order to determine how best to "split the orange" to achieve
the common goal of neighborhood revitalization.13
II. ORIGIN OF BROWNFIELDS
A. RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Following World War II, years of industrial growth produced a
diversity of chemical compounds and hazardous byproducts that
permeated industrial zones throughout the nation. These prod-
ucts, if left unchecked, threatened to leach into residential areas
and other vital aspects of the human environment. 14 In response to
this threat, Congress, in 1976, passed the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 15 which allows the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to monitor hazardous waste production from
"cradle to grave," and to impose strict operation standards for gen-
erators, owners, operators and transporters of hazardous wastes. 16
RCRA was enacted in response to a House committee report that
10. For a discussion of the Environmental justice movement and its impact on
redeveloping brownfields, see infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the benefits that can emerge from successful
brownfields redevelopment, see infra notes 75-101 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of how a successful brownfields redevelopment can result
in community revitalization, see infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the conclusion that early unification and cooperation
among parties can achieve the goal of neighborhood revitalization, see infra notes
115-17 and accompanying text.
14. See Utt, supra note 4, at 1.
15. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997) [hereinafter RCRA].
16. See Tara Burns Koch, Comment, Betting on Brownfields - Does Florida's
Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into Opportunity?, 28 STETSON L.
REv. 171, 177 (1998) (discussing requirements of RCRA and impact of RCRA on
brownfields development). RCRA regulates hazardous waste production from its
creation to its disposal. See id. In terms of brownfields, RCRA impacted contami-
nated property redevelopment "(1) by attaching costly regulation requirements to
underground storage tanks... and (2) by authorizing the 'government or citizens
to require cleanup at sites that may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971 (a)(1),
6973). Such statutory requirements have resulted in landowners or operators be-
ing held primarily responsible for the cost of a cleanup stemming from contamina-
tion of real property by hazardous substances. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of
20001
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detailed the amount of waste materials created annually in the
United States.17 While RCRA addressed the production of hazardous
waste, it left a gaping loophole regarding existing hazardous contam-
ination. The Love Canal crisis in the late 1970s symbolizes the
prime example of the type of situation that RCRA failed to
address.' 8
B. CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
The tribulations of the Love Canal incident brought the conse-
quences of decades of wanton mismanagement of hazardous mater-
ials and the need to ascribe liability for remediation and reparation
of contaminated real property to the forefront of the American
conscience. As a result, during the waning days of the Carter Ad-
ministration, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 96 U.
ILL. L. REv. 883, 897 (1996).
17. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 2 (1976). The house report estimated that
three to four billion tons of solid waste were created every year and tended to grow
at an estimated rate of eight percent annually. See id. The report further projected
that landfill capacity in half of the United States' largest cities would be expended
by 1980. See id. at 9. This would force cities to dispose of their waste in far away
sites, resulting in higher transportation costs. See id. This was becoming increas-
ingly difficult, however, due to local opposition from these cities to receiving haz-
ardous waste from other locations. See id.
18. In 1953, the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation (Hooker) trans-
ferred its title to a 16-acre site to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for the sum
of one dollar. See Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund:
Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 285, 290-91
n.23 (1995) (discussing Love Canal crisis); see also Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmen-
tal Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelop-
ment, 10 TUL. ENvTh. L.J. 63, 66 n.3 (1996) (stating that "[b]etween 1942 and 1953,
the Hooker Chemical Company filled an abandoned hydroelectric channel in
Love Canal, New York with over 21,000 tons of chemical waste"). Hooker acknowl-
edged that chemical byproducts from its production process were buried on the
site and then covered with a layer of clay. See id. When Hooker transferred the
property to the Niagara Falls Board of Education, Hooker mandated that the deed
contain a 17-line restriction indicating that it would not be held responsible for
any injuries that might result due to the buried byproducts. See Solo, supra, at 290
n.23. This restriction in the deed also served to warn future owners of the possible
damages, thereby indemnifying Hooker for any claims. See id.; see also Rimer,
supra, at 66 n.3.
A school and 100 homes were built on the site, and this area became known as
the Love Canal. See id. Following unseasonably heavy rains in 1978, a chemical
soup of more than 80 different substances, including many known carcinogens,
began to seep into residential basements. See id. The ensuing cleanup efforts re-
sulted in the relocation of 1,000 families and demolition of all structures along the
canal. See id.
[Vol. XI: p. I
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pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 19 was born. Commonly
known as "Superfund," CERCLA establishes a fund that EPA utilizes
to pay for the emergency abatement or cleanup of sites that present
an imminent or substantial endangerment to public health or the
environment. 20 The fund is replenished via a broad liability
scheme which imposes strict liability upon an inclusive cast of po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs).21 PRPs are subject to joint and
several liability for all the costs of removal or remediation of con-
tamination, damages for injury to natural resources, and costs of
health assessments. 22
As an added incentive to prevent releases of hazardous sub-
stances and encourage voluntary abatement of past releases, courts
initially interpreted the strict liability provision of CERCLA as im-
posing liability "without regard to causation." 23 While the main
purpose of CERCLA appears to be its cleanup program, the real
thrust of the Act is to make future releases of hazardous substances
"less likely through liability, enlisting business and commercial in-
stincts for the bottom line in place of traditional regulation. It was
19. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
20. See CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (imposing provisions and limitations
on president's use of fund).
21. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (establishing liability for costs
incurred by government or others and for damages for injury to natural re-
sources). This cast of potentially liable characters includes: (1) current owners
and operators of facilities where the release of hazardous materials is imminent or
substantial, (2) owners and operators of facilities at the time of hazardous waste
disposal, (3) persons who arranged for the transportation or disposal of hazardous
materials, and (4) persons who accepted hazardous substances for transport or
disposal. See id. These individuals are liable unless they can prove that the damage
was caused by (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, or (3) a third party's act or
omission. In the case of a third party, he cannot be an employee or agent of the
defendant. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b); see also United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that "although the
statute includes these defenses, courts interpret them very narrowly, limiting their
successful use by litigants").
22. See CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (creating provisions for assess-
ment of punitive and treble damages).
23. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that § 9607(a) imposes strict liability without requiring showing of causa-
tion). In Shore Realty Corp., the State of New York brought suit against Shore Realty
Corporation (Shore) to force Shore to clean up a hazardous waste site. See id. at
1037. Even though Shore was not responsible for the hazardous waste being on its
property, it knew that that the waste site was located on its premises and that the
cleanup would be expensive. See id. The Second Circuit held Shore liable, empha-
sizing that § 9607(a) (1) of CERCLA contained no requirement as to a finding of
causation. See id. at 1044. The court drew its support from Congress itself, citing
that "Congress specifically rejected including a causation requirement in section
9607(a)." Id.
20001
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a conscious intention of the statute's authors to draw lenders and
insurers into a new army of quasi-regulators along with corporate
risk managers and boards of directors."2 4 Even though CERCLA's
goals include both remedying past acts and deterring future acts,
the broad imposition of responsibility upon a wide variety of parties
and pocketbooks has the unintended "chilling effect" of impeding
the redevelopment of current and former industrial properties,
turning them into what is commonly known today as brownfields.
C. The Brownfields Problem
Brownfields are defined by EPA as "abandoned, idled, or
under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination."25 This definition of brownfields reflects the un-
derstanding that the real property in question may or may not be
contaminated and that the factual or perceived contamination may
not be the sole criteria for the property's lack of use. Among the
litany of potential reasons for lack of use, however, PRP liability
reigns supreme among the contenders.2 6 Property owners attempt-
24. Philip T. Cummings, NEPA to CERCLA: Completing the Circle, 7 ENVTL. F.
10, 11 (Nov./Dec. 1990). At CERCLA's core is its liability provisions. See id. CER-
CLA combines both strict liability and 'joint and several liability." See id. This
allows the government the luxury of not having to prove negligence in a CERCLA
case, as well as allowing it to collect containment and cleanup costs from any of the
guilty parties. See id.; see also CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (enumerating CER-
CLA's joint and several liability provisions).
25. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION AGENDA (May 1997)
(defining "brownfields" and enumerating how various federal agencies will work
together to create and implement brownfields redevelopment plans). See Ryan,
supra note 3 (noting that General Accounting Office estimates that 400,000 to
500,000 brownfield sites exist across United States). EPA created the Brownfields
Action Agenda in early 1995 following Congress's failure to pass the 1994
Superfund Reform Act. See Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space,
Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C. ENVrL. AlT. L. REV. 589, 609 (1998). This, com-
bined with the rise of the Environmental Justice movement and President Clin-
ton's issuance of his 1994 Executive Order on Environmental Justice, pushed the
issue of brownfields redevelopment to the forefront of the American political
scene. See id.; see also DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 41 (discussing Clinton
Administration's brownfields policies). For a further discussion of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's efforts to promote brownfields redevelopment, see infra notes 44-54
and accompanying text.
26. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 598-605 (citing liability under CERCLA as pri-
mary reason for brownfields to remain unused and thus contributing to economic
decline in many neighborhoods); see also Eisen, supra note 16, at 897 (emphasizing
that both fear of liability and uncertain cleanup costs prevent many developers
from utilizing brownfields). Developers also fear the uncertainty of whether they
will be subject to state regulation instead of federal regulation because a state is
principally responsible for: (1) sites that do not rise to the level of necessitating
[Vol. XI: p. I
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ing to sell unwanted facilities may be faced with large testing costs
and potential cleanup bills that may render a "hold" decision to be
the most economically sound.27 Owners of businesses that are no
longer viable may directly deed the property to a municipality, the
lender, or may simply "walk away" and let the State foreclose on
unpaid tax liens. Thus, the brownfield remains an unused,
boarded-up eyesore with potential health and safety problems,
which persist undiscovered for fear of PRP liability.
28
The brownfields problem intensifies when it is noted that
many brownfields are concentrated in inner city, lower income, and
predominantly minority areas of many U.S. cities. 29 No current ac-
curate count exists, but the Congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment estimates that there might be "tens of thousands to
450,000 brownfields sites nationwide." 30 These idle brownfields di-
rectly contribute to dwindling sales tax revenues, property tax reve-
federal action and (2) sites that a state may choose to regulate in the absence of
federal regulation. See id. at 900. Thus, the fear of liability exists on many levels,
potentially preventing brownfields from being redeveloped at all. See id.
27. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 601 (noting that many regarded brownfields as
"untouchables" due to large costs associated with their remediation).
28. See id. (emphasizing effect of liability on reluctance to redevelop
brownfields); see also Ryan, supra note 3 (noting examples of typical brownfields,
including "a closed gas station or dry cleaner, a vacant warehouse, an abandoned
rail yard, a former coal plant, or a shuttered steel mill"); Eisen, supra note 16, at
914 (outlining that high urban crime and obsolete infrastructures of existing
buildings also cause developers to shy away from brownfields).
29. See Eisen, supra note 16, at 891. Many municipal representatives and
scholars have remarked that a great number of brownfields are located in the so-
called "Rust Belt" cities of the northeastern and midwest United States. See id. The
concentration of brownfields in these cities further enhances the potential for
these areas to decline because brownfields "discourage urban investment and con-
tribute to a pervasive sense of poverty and hopelessness." Id. at 895; see also Kibel,
supra note 25, at 601 (observing that "[a]bandoned brownfields tended to drag
surrounding properties and communities down with them, thereby reinforcing the
cycle").
Developers tend to gravitate towards "greenfields" in order to avoid
brownfields, thus encouraging suburban sprawl and the destruction of areas that
were previously untouched. See id. at 602. A greenfield has been defined as "prop-
erty that has not been previously used for commercial or industrial activities and is
thus presumed free of contamination." DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 5.
While greenfield development may reap economic benefits, some of the unfortu-
nate consequences of developing these greenfields include the destruction of eco-
nomic and environmental resources and an increase in pollution. See Kibel, supra
note 25, at 596, 602. Thus, the development of a greenfield, as opposed to the
redevelopment of a brownfield, will have a potentially detrimental impact years
after the greenfield developments have outlived their usefulness. See Eisen, supra
note 16, at 896.
30. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE
OF CONTAMINATED SITES 3 (1995); see also Ryan, supra note 3 (citing existence of
400,000 to 500,000 brownfields sites across United States).
2000]
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nues, lost jobs, and lost wages. Consequently, it is not difficult to
quantify how the revitalization of many inner cities depends on the
success of transforming unproductive brownfields into income-gen-
erating assets that are competitive alternatives to greenfields devel-
opment, i.e. undeveloped, pristine land tracts. 31
III. DESTIGMATIZING BROWNFIELDS DEVELOPMENT
The pure economy of the brownfields situation motivated fed-
eral and state agencies, as well as Congress and the judiciary, to
remove obstacles to brownfields development in an effort to
destigmatize these urban assets and promote urban revitalization.
Of primary concern for developers, lenders, and insurers was the
broad liability that the Eleventh Circuit read into CERCLA in the
1990 case of United States v. Fleet Factors Cop.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit
in Fleet Factors interpreted CERCLA's language as imposing full lia-
bility on covered parties regardless of fault and the presence of
other responsible parties.33 Specifically, the court imputed liability
to a party who participated in the "financial management of a facil-
ity to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes."34
Thus, without assurances of immunity for any action taken in
foreclosing, lending, or insuring brownfields, financial entities that
control the destiny of brownfields development have little incentive
31. See DAvis & MARGoIus, supra note 7, at 5, 12 (discussing attributes of
brownfields and competition to redevelop them rather than using greenfields).
Turning to greenfields rather than brownfields results in a phenomenon known as
urban sprawl, "the practice of building on previously undeveloped land outside the
city limits." Id. at 12. Urban sprawl can result in a city's infrastructure going un-
used while comparable infrastructures are replicated elsewhere. See id.; see also Ei-
sen, supra note 16, at 896 (enumerating negative results of utilizing greenfields
over brownfields, including population problems, increased pollution, and neces-
sity of increasing infrastructures to serve new greenfield developments). For a fur-
ther discussion of greenfields, see supra note 29.
In contrast, employing brownfields over greenfields will prevent many of the
negatives mentioned above from occurring. Many existing brownfields sites have
good water and sewer systems already in place, and provide better accessibility to
those already living in the city. See id. at 897. Most importantly, the redevelopment
of brownfields can serve to rejuvenate a city's economy by concentrating more
activity within the city's boundaries than in its suburbs. See id.
32. 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that Congress's intent in creating
CERCLA was to hold secured creditors liable if they participated in management
of facility).
33. See generally id.
34. Id. at 1557. A party need not be involved in the day-to-day operations of a
facility and need not participate in its waste management decisions to be held lia-
ble. See id. Thus, a party will be held liable "if its involvement with the manage-
ment of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Id. at 1558.
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to open their arms or bank vaults to prospective developers, no
matter how good the location or prospect of future income.3 5 Con-
gress noted this concern in passing the Asset Conservation, Lender
Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act.3 6 This Act allows
lenders and the like, who do not become enmeshed in the day-to-
day management or decision-making process at a contaminated
site, to be free from liability if contamination damage is later found
at the site. 3
7
A. State and Local Brownfields Initiatives
For entities that remain involved in the day-to-day operations
of a contaminated site, the liability door is still wide open. EPA
reserves the right under CERCLA to enter into settlement agree-
ments that quantify the amount of liability for a given site prior to
any EPA abatement action.3 8 EPA retains, however, the option of
reopening the case at any time and reimposing unlimited liability
on all PRPs involved. 39 Consequently, for many investors, EPA set-
tlement agreements do nothing to thaw the chill of brownfields
investment.
In response, many states, eager to encourage brownfields in-
vestment, initiated voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs). 4 ° State
35. See id. at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors acknowledged this
potential effect. See id. at 1558. The court, however, found these concerns un-
founded. See id. The Fleet Factors court asserted that its ruling should encourage
creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment policies of the potential
borrower and include these risks in the loan agreement. See id. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that "[c]reditors, therefore, will incur no greater risk than they
bargained for and debtors, aware that inadequate hazardous waste treatment will
have a significant adverse impact on their loan terms, will have powerful incentives
to improve their handling of hazardous wastes." Id.
36. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 30009 (1996) (amended CERCLA
§ 107(n), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)) (insulating fiduciaries from liability and providing
safe harbor provisions).
37. See id. Fiduciaries shall not be held personally liable for conducting fidu-
ciary-type activities and for decision-making. See id.
38. See CERCLA § 122(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b) (1).
39. See id. § 122(F) (6), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6). The settlement agreement
can be reopened and liability imposed for conditions unknown at the time of set-
tlement, or if new information indicates that the action taken was not sufficient to
protect public health and the environment. See id.
40. See Sarah W. Rubenstein, Comment, CERCLA's Contribution to the Federal
Brownfields Problem: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 149,
164 (1997) (remarking that VCP was created to allow PRPs "to elect to remediate
contaminated property in exchange for finalized liability at that site"). Even
though VCPs differ from state to state, some common elements do exist. See Eisen,
supra note 16, at 920. For example, compliance with a VCP is voluntary, and each
program is guided by a streamlined cleanup process where "developers continue
2000]
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VCPs reward owners and investors with clear and ascertainable
cleanup standards and quantifiable limits on liability.41 The most
common VCP liability assurances are "No Further Action" letters
(NFA), "Covenants Not to Sue" (CNTS), and "Certificates of Com-
pletion" (COC).42 Typical VCP financial incentives range from
small grants for preliminary testing to Revolving Loan Funds (RLF)
for larger scale remediation and state tax exemptions. 43 While
these programs are creative and innovative methods for states to
spur brownfields investment, VCPs are not, in and of themselves,
sufficient to stimulate wholesale neighborhood revitalization on a
scale that is necessary to cure some of the larger tracts of idle land.
cleanups in a fast-tracked process to meet redefined cleanup standards." See id. at
921. An investigation of the site is commenced to determine the existing condi-
tions at the site, the developer then prepares and implements the plan. See id. As
of 1996, Pennsylvania and Ohio had the most comprehensive VCP plans of all
participating states. See id. at 920.
41. See Rubenstein, supra note 40, at 164 (noting that "finalized liability" en-
courages developers not only to acquire brownfields but also to remediate their
own brownfields).
42. See Eisen, supra note 16, at 952-57 (describing various VCP liability assur-
ances states can issue). The purpose of the NFA is to inform a developer that the
state will not require any further cleanup of the contaminated site, nor pursue any
type of enforcement action against the developer. See id. at 952. The developer
will receive such an assurance if the contamination level is too low for regulatory
concerns, if there is no contamination at all, or if the contamination level exceeds
acceptable standards and the developer has completed the approved cleanup. See
id.; see also R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legisla-
tion, 2 EN\rL. L. 101, 118 (1995) (stating that developers who satisfy cleanup re-
quirements qualify for NFA). The NFA, although, does not guarantee that the
state will not force the developer to clean up the site if unknown contamination
presents itself in the future. See Eisen, supra note 16, at 954.
In contrast to the NFA, CNTS offer express protection against the possibility
of future enforced cleanups at the site. See id. at 955; see also Sweeney, supra, at 118
(finding that state will grant CNTS "in consideration for the proper and timely
completion of the state voluntary cleanup program"). A state may first require that
the developer obtain a NFA or COC prior to issuing the CNTS. See Eisen, supra
note 16, at 955-56.
Finally, the COC is "a state approval of successful completion of cleanup activi-
ties." Id. at 956. The developer must receive confirmation of the cleanup's com-
pletion and agree to cooperate with the state, maintaining and monitoring the site,
and completing any future cleanups. See id. Moreover, the COC creates broad
liability protections for the developer. See id.
43. See Rubenstein, supra note 40, at 171. Financial incentives enhance the
brownfields programs and encourage redevelopment. See id. Not all states, how-
ever, offer these financial incentives. See Eisen, supra note 16, at 977. Those states
that do provide these financial incentives are usually provided to public entities
and sometimes even to developers of brownfields themselves. See id. (naming
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania as states which utilize
financial incentives).
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B. Brownfields Pilot Programs
In 1993, the Clinton Administration brought a proactive atti-
tude towards environmentalism that had been missing during the
previous twelve years of Republican rule, based on the Reagan Ad-
ministration's reluctance to enforce the provisions of CERCLA due
to CERCLA's perceived shortcomings. 44 In November 1993, the
first Brownfields Pilot Program was launched in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio. 45 The potential success of the pilot program was inspired by
a Clinton-sponsored bill which attempted to reform CERCIA's
shortcomings. The bill was defeated, however, in the final days of
the 103rd Congress.46 Thereafter, in 1995, EPA announced its
Brownfields Action Agenda that outlined four key areas of action
for returning brownfields to productive use: (1) pilot grant pro-
grams, (2) partnership programs for brownfields stakeholders, (3)
fostering local workforce development, and (4) job training
initiatives. 4 7
The essential first step to federal assistance came in the form of
aligning the myriad of federal agencies that impact brownfields.
Agency oversight needed to be streamlined in order to make the
cleanup process efficient and to motivate investor interest. The pri-
mary vehicle for achieving this goal became the "Memorandum of
Understanding"(MOU). The general purpose of the MOU used by
EPA in connection with its Brownfields Action Agenda is to "estab-
44. See generally TRAvis P. WAGNER, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HAZARDOUS
WASTE REGULATIONS 295 (3d ed. 1997); see also DAvis & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at
41 (remarking that "[t]he Clinton Administration's Brownfields Initiative is
designed to empower states, localities, and other agents of economic redevelop-
ment to work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, safely remediate, and
sustainably reuse brownfields").
45. See DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 45 (discussing monies used to re-
mediate existing brownfields in Cuyahoga County, Ohio).
46. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 603. Congress did not pass the Superfund
Reform Act, thus shifting the drive for CERCLA reform to the agency level. See id.
EPA created the Brownfields Action Agenda in response to the Superfund Reform
Act's defeat in Congress. See Mark Reisch, Supefund and the Brownfields Issue (vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-10.html>.
47. See Reisch, supra note 46 (discussing four main methods EPA would use to
increase interest in redeveloping brownfields). EPA Administrator Carol Browner
described EPA's Brownfields Action Agenda as "a work in progress" where the
Agenda would continuously be redefined and updated in order to stay consistent
with the increasing number of brownfields being redeveloped. See id.; see also Ei-
sen, supra note 16, at 979 (stating that purposes of Brownfields Action Agenda
were to stimulate brownfields redevelopment and to clarify issues regarding CER-
CLA liability); Rubenstein, supra note 40, at 175 (stating that EPA hoped that
Brownfields Action Agenda would also result in job training and establishment of
inner city empowerment zones stemming from brownfields redevelopment). For a
further discussion of EPA's Pilot Programs, see infra notes 49-53 and accompany-
ing text.
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lish policies and procedures for a general working agreement be-
tween [various federal agencies] in support of the EPA's
Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative (BERI) ."48
With agency alignment in place, the federal brownfields initia-
tive was able to move forward with the heart of its financial assist-
ance program: the Brownfields Pilot Program.49 The Brownfields
Pilot Program went into effect in 1995, with fifty pilot projects re-
ceiving up to $200,000 each in federal funding to support two-year
demonstrations of redevelopment solutions.50 The goal of the Pilot
Programs is to "develop a national policy regarding Brownfields re-
development [and] serve as guidance to states and localities strug-
gling with this issue."51 The Pilot Programs serve to "test
redevelopment models by removing regulatory barriers without sac-
rificing environmental protection; encourage community groups,
investors, lenders, developers and other [stakeholders] to work to-
gether to clean up contaminated sites and return them to produc-
tive use . . . and establish guidelines for cities cleaning up and
returning contaminated, abandoned property back to productive
48. Memorandum of Understanding between Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, EPA, and Econ. Dev. Admin., Apr. 28, 1995 (emphasizing
that federal government and individual state governments must work together in
order to achieve success in redeveloping brownfields). MOUs allow agencies to
attack procedural issues early and establish proactive guidelines towards a com-
mon goal. See, e.g., id. Typical goals of an MOU include creating site assessment
criteria, establishing cleanup standards, addressing community revitalization is-
sues, and spurring economic redevelopment efforts. See Memorandum of Under-
standing between EPA and Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Sept. 20, 1996
(reducing to writing EPA's and HUD's agreement to use their combined energies
to redevelop brownfields).
49. See Sweeney, supra note 42, at 118 (discussing fine details of pilot pro-
grams); see also Ryan, supra note 3 (observing that Brownfields Pilot Programs serve
to assist communities in overcoming obstacles associated with transforming
brownfields into areas of productive use). The pilot projects also seek to "facilitate
community-based and coordinated input" while brownfields are in the process of
remediation. See MARGOLIS & DAvis, supra note 7, at 45.
50. See Announcement of Competition for Final Five Brownfields Econ. Rede-
velopment Initiative Pilots, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,012 (1994) (noting necessity of pilot
programs in state and local governments and their respective communities which
will have to address brownfields eventually); see also Ryan, supra note 3 (comment-
ing that "[o] ne goal of EPA's pilot programs is to illustrate that a small amount of
federal money directed at brownfields can leverage major private investment in
redevelopment efforts"). The following criteria were used by EPA in deciding
which cities would host the pilot programs: "(1) the applicant's problem state-
ment and needs assessment, (2) evidence of community-based planning and in-
volvement, (3) the applicant's implementation plan, and (4) the long-term
benefits and sustainability of the project." DAvis & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 45.
As of 1997, the $200,000 had been leveraged to about $3.2 million to support the
remediation of brownfields. See Ryan, supra note 3 (recounting numerous pilot
program success stories).
51. Sweeney, supra note 42, at 118.
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use."52 By the end of 1998, EPA had funded a total of 228
brownfields pilots and planned to initiate another 100 new pilots in
1999. 53
In addition to the Pilot Programs, other assorted federal and
local funding programs are in place. These programs seek to reju-
venate underused properties in order to revitalize communities.
54
A combination of grants and tax incentives function to leverage
public and private investment into projects that are otherwise very
difficult to finance conventionally.
C. Brownfields Development Controversy
Thus, with liability and financing issues addressed, only one as-
pect of the urban revitalization puzzle remains at the core of the
brownfields development controversy: will private investors, driven
purely by market-oriented goals, provide developments that benefit
host communities with jobs, tax revenues, and sustainability? Or
will these heavily subsidized brownfields programs merely be a new
incarnation of the site's previous uses, offering little direct eco-
nomic benefit and substantial health and safety hazards? The Envi-
ronmental Justice movement was born in response to these
questions.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The Environmental Justice movement emerged, as other grass-
roots organizations sprouted up, in response to historical inequities
and disproportionate allocations of risk in the siting of hazardous
facilities in communities with large percentages of minorities.5 5 En-
52. Id. at 118-19. By limiting a prospective buyer's liability, "EPA will alleviate
the concerns of parties participating in Brownfields reuse or redevelopment." Id.
at 119; see also Eisen, supra note 16, at 981 (observing that pilot programs also seek
to develop "intergovernmental cooperation networks for brownfield cleanups" and
"[identify] sites for cleanups").
53. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION IX BROWNFIELDS PART-
NERSHIP ACTION AGENDA (Jan. 7, 1999).
54. Other funding programs include, but are not limited to, Community De-
velopment Block Grants (CDBG), HUD Section 108 Loan Guarantees, Empower-
ment Zones and Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC), and Tax Increment Financing
(TIF). See generally CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COIIATON, NORTHEAST MID-
WEST INSTITUTE, COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK
ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES app. c
(1996).
55. See William A. Shutkin & Charles P. Lord, Environmental Law, Environmen-
tal Justice, and Democracy, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (1994) (claiming that minor-
ities and members of low-income communities "have borne the brunt of
environmental harms"); see also AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (explain-
ing that members of environmental justice groups are no longer just minorities
2000]
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vironmental Justice constituents are generally composed of lower
and middle class families who lack the political muscle to oppose
effectively the construction of hazardous facilities or "vote with
their feet" and move away these facilities once they are in place.56
The Clinton Administration took two actions to help raise the
political profile of the Environmental Justice movement. First, on
September 30, 1993, President Clinton established the National En-
vironmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) to provide in-
dependent advice, consultations, and recommendations to the EPA
Administrator on environmental justice matters.57 Second, on Feb-
ruary 11, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898,
also known as "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low Income Populations."58 This Execu-
tive Order states, "To the greatest extent practicable and permitted
by law.., each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropri-
ate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environ-
mental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations." 59
A. NEJAC - National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
The stated goal of the NEJAC is to develop a "holistic, bot-
tomup, community-based, multi-issue, cross-cutting, integrative,
and low-income individuals, but now include people concerned with day-to-day
affairs of their respective communities). The Environmental Justice movement
represents a desire to reach traditionally underrepresented communities and
teach them about environmental law and policy. See Shutkin & Lord, supra, at
1120. This movement has evolved to encompass a "community driven process"
which seeks to use public discourse to create healthy, productive, and vital commu-
nities. See AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (maintaining that environmen-
tal justice will create "a transformative discourse" which will shape communities in
twenty-first century). "Environmental justice will be the seed-bed for the develop-
ment of a set of new frameworks and tools truly capable of producing physically
and psychologically healthy, economically and ecologically sustainable, and cultur-
ally and spiritually vital communities." Id.
56. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); see also Kibel, supra note 25, at 606 (recalling
that Environmental Justice movement focuses on recognition that poor communi-
ties and minorities suffer from "disproportionately high health and environmental
risks").
57. See OFFICE OF ENvL. JUSTICE, EPA, THE MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC PARTICI-
PATION ii (Nov. 1996). For a further discussion of the NEJAC, see infra notes 60-74
and accompanying text.
58. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994).
59. Id. (detailing federal agencies' responsibilities regarding environmental
justice); see also AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (stating that only by unit-
ing various federal agencies can federal government hope to "address the interre-
lated issues associated with urban revitalization and Brownfields").
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and unifying paradigm for achieving healthy and sustainable com-
munities-both urban and rural."60 The organization seeks to
place the Environmental Justice agenda at the forefront of all dis-
cussions regarding brownfields development and hazardous facility
siting. It is through this ultra-inclusive stance that the NEJAC seeks
to organize local groups to remedy the issues that have plagued
lower income and minority neighborhoods and to achieve greater
environmental goals, such as stemming the tide of urban sprawl.61
Supporters of the Environmental Justice movement view brown-
fields redevelopment as an attempt by overzealous politicians and
investors to skirt liability issues, loosen cleanup standards, and at-
tract businesses that add little to the sustainability of communities
while increasing potential health hazards. Therefore, it is not un-
common for local groups to unite in opposition to proposed
brownfields development where these groups have not been con-
sulted or included. 6
2
60. AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2.
61. See id.
62. See DAviS & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 183-92 (stressing that community
participation is key to success of brownfields development). One such display of
opposition resulted in an EPA decision to suspend air emissions permits for the
proposed siting of a $700 million PVC (polyvinyl chloride) manufacturing facility
in Convent, Louisiana. See generally Statement by Congressman William Jefferson on the
Decision to Postpone Shintech Inc.'s Permit, Gov'T PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 10, 1997). A
coalition of citizens' groups alleged that the Louisiana Department of Environ-
mental Quality's issuance of the air permits involved racial discrimination. See id.
The group's contention was that the proposed facility would disproportionately
burden the surrounding low-income populations with increased levels of pollu-
tion, and health and environmental risks. See id.
The petitioners also contended that the cumulative effect of additional pollu-
tion, in light of the high pollution burden already borne by adjacent communities,
was not considered and that the poor enforcement record of environmental agen-
cies in the area would exacerbate the problem. See Mike Dunne, Shintech Withdraws
Plan; West Baton Rouge Location Selected for Smaller Facility, THE ADVOC. (Baton
Rouge, La.), Sept. 18, 1998, at IA. EPA's decision to suspend issuance of the air
permits eventually forced the chemical company to abandon its plans in favor of a
smaller site in an adjacent town that did not present similar demographic chal-
lenges. See id. (noting that Shintech Controller thinks new site will "raise fewer
environmental justice questions because the area is whiter and more affluent" than
previous proposed site). Environmental Justice advocates hailed this decision as a
victory even though the residents of Convent were not unanimous in their opposi-
tion to the facility. See id. (commenting that even though facility would harm envi-
ronment, many people would support facility because of potential jobs it would
create for community). The local chapter of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 73% of African-American residents
polled supported the facility because of the jobs and other economic benefits it
would have brought to the area. See Stephen C. Jones & Anoop G. Shroff, Balanc-
ing Growth and the Environment; Environmental Justice Concerns Delay Industrial Expan-
sion, 13 ENV. CoMP. & LIT. STRATEGY, Oct. 1997, § 5, at 1.
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B. NEJAC Public Dialogues
In an effort to understand the issues affecting the citizens most
impacted by brownfields development, the NEJAC and EPA co-
sponsored a series of "Public Dialogues" in five major cities (At-
lanta, Boston, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Oakland) across the coun-
try.63 The dialogues were scheduled to (1) provide a forum for
local citizens to ask questions of federal administrators, (2) air
grievances with past agency practice, and (3) suggest new policies
to encourage responsible and inclusive brownfields development. 64
The result of these dialogues was a report released by the NEJAC
entitled "Environmental Justice, Urban Revitalization, and
Brownfields: The Search for Authentic Signs of Hope. '65 The re-
port's goal was to provide both an understanding of local concerns,
as well as a framework for public participation at all stages of the
brownfields development process. 66
The NEJAC report was successful in inspiring and promoting
federal agencies to encourage grant applicants to include commu-
nity input and participation in both the planning and implementa-
tion process. 67 Examples of this are the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Enterprise Zone/Eco-
63. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 610 (explaining that public dialogues were
intended to provide forum to discuss EPA's new administrative policies before
their adoption); see also AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (noting that dur-
ing course of Public Dialogues, its participants considered question of whether
Executive Order 12898 could be "[a] vehicle[ ] for coalescing a strategy for linking
environmental justice to . .. the state of the urban environment").
64. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 610 (noting that Public Dialogues included
people from various backgrounds and with varied objectives). Many people partic-
ipated in the Public Dialogues, including representatives from community groups,
government agencies, religious groups, unions, universities, banks, and philan-
thropies. See id. (providing that Public Dialogues revealed broad community-based
interest in brownfields issue); see also AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (re-
marking that Public Dialogues' participants emphasized "a new power relationship
within which communities are an integral part of the decision-making process
'from beginning to end'").
65. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 610 (commenting that report was released in
1995 by NEJAC's Waste and Facility Siting Subcommittee and EPA). Such an idea
is in keeping with the current Environmental Justice rationale, namely that com-
munities want involvement in making decisions that will impact their neighbor-
hood's environment.
66. See id. at 611 (explaining that Public Dialogues in different cities demon-
strated existence of very different objectives and goals among varied stakeholders
involved in brownfields project).
67. See id. at 611-12 (providing that because of NEJAC and Public Dialogues,
many groups continue to define evolution of brownfields issue by forming organi-
zations to pursue their own goals).
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nomic Community (EZ/EC) 68 and Economic Development Initia-
tive/Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (EDI/BEDI) 69
applications, which include categories for community participation
as factors for determining grants. While the point values for com-
munity factors are not high, they are enough to encourage appli-
cants to give these issues more than a cursory inspection because of
the competitiveness of the grant process.
An unstated benefit of the NEJAC report has been to provide a
sense of focus and clarity for the Environmental Justice movement
as a whole, which too often is criticized for being associated with
"NIMBYism" 70 or pure social or racial concerns. 71 The rhetoric of
risk and racism misconstrues the challenge of revitalizing neighbor-
hoods and achieving healthy, sustainable, and livable communi-
ties. 72 With the motivation for private investment being primarily
pecuniary, the risk of loss needs to be quantifiable and within the
realm of commercial realism. 73 Therefore, Environmental Justice
concerns can reap the highest rewards in those instances where
they can assist in clearly defining a problem and working towards
68. See DEPARTMENT OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., EMPOWERMENT ZONE/ENTER-
PRISE COMMUNITY INITIATIVE APPLICATION KIT (1998).
69. See DEPARTMENT OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., ECON. DEV. INITIATIVE AND
BROWNFIELDS ECON. DEV. APPLICATION KIT (1998).
70. See Eisen, supra note 16, at 992. NIMBYism (Not In My BackYard) involves
opposition of a small group to a controversial development project which will re-
sult in scattered benefits for a larger group of people. See id. In other words, many
will benefit at the expense of concentrated costs for the immediate community
being affected. See id. (noting that since early 1980s, many states require develop-
ers to provide compensation to communities that host waste facilities).
71. See G. Nelson Smith & David B. Graham, To Achieve EnvironmentalJustice,
Attack Economic Causes Of Urban Blight, LEGAL TIMES, ENVTL. L. SEC., June 16, 1997,
at S46. But see AuTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (asserting that environmen-
tal justice has evolved into more community-based movement as opposed to defin-
ing itself only along economic or racial lines).
72. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998); see alsoJulie Rajzer, The Environmental Justice Informa-
tion Homepage (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www-personal.umich.edu/-jrajzer/
nre/index.html> (confirming belief that environmental justice transcends its origi-
nal deliniation and now encompasses "a guarantee of equal access to relief and
meaningful community participation with government and industry decision-mak-
ers"); AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (maintaining that community con-
cerns are now major facet of environmental justice).
73. See DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 87 (stating that many potential
private investors shy away from brownfields because of investment risks involved).
Some commentators have proposed that "[tihe presence of environmental con-
tamination on a site increases both liability and investment risks. These risks must
be lowered to levels that are reasonable and acceptable for increased public and
private-sector investments to occur in brownfields." Id. For a further discussion of
liability risks associated with brownfields redevelopment, see supra notes 25-31 and
accompanying text.
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crafting a realistic solution. When effectively done, this process can
leverage public dollars to obtain substantial private investment for
community gain, as demonstrated in the destigmatization process. 74
V. PROFILE OF A SUCCESSFUL BROWNFIELDS DEVELOPMENT
A. Two Tales of One City
The Lawndale district in Chicago's westside emerged from the
ashes of the Great Chicago fire in 1871 as industry abandoned the
charred ruins of the central city.7 5 Lawndale's first inhabitants were
Dutch, Irish, and German immigrants. 76 By 1930, Lawndale was
Chicago's largest Jewish neighborhood with 51,000 people per
square mile, forty-nine synagogues, homes for the elderly and or-
phans, and a well-stocked public library.77 Two industrial giants
anchored Lawndale's economy, International Harvester and West-
ern Electric, both of which employed over 57,000 people
combined. 78
74. A successful example of leveraging public funds to encourage private in-
vestment occurred in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where more than 250 dilapidated
and vacant buildings were impeding the private development process and draining
scarce public resources through vandalism response, devaluation, and a declining
tax base. See The United States Conference of Mayors (May 19, 1997). The City of
Bridgeport organized an anti-blight campaign to eradicate the structures, conduct
site assessments, and if necessary, remedy environmental problems. See id. With
input from area residents and local business owners, Bridgeport spent approxi-
mately $15 million over six years which, in turn, inspired $61 million in private
housing and commercial development. See id. Mayor Joseph Ganin proclaimed,
"we want the housing stock to be affordable, safe and attractive for anyone willing
to lead a productive life ... where families and businesses can prosper and feel like
part of the community." Id.
75. See R.C. Longworth, Lawndale's Lots Eerily Empty, Haunted By Economy That
Died, CHi. TRmB., Nov. 17, 1985, § News, at I (providing that Lawndale received its
name in 1870 from real estate firm which originally designed city's layout). In
1871, many Chicago city-centered industries moved to Lawndale to escape the
downtown ruins left in the aftermath of the Chicago Fire. See id. (noting that In-
ternational Harvester, formerly known as McCormick Reaper Co., was first major
business to move to Lawndale).
76. See id. (explaining that Lawndale's inhabitants arrived there around turn
of century along with elevated tracks and industry). Following the emergence of
the elevated tracks, Sears Ryerson Steel Co. and Western Electric also relocated to
Lawndale. See id. Cottages near the factories housed the workers. See id.
77. See id. (noting that Lawndale had twice as many people per square mile
than Chicago). Longworth, in reference to this booming community, stated that
[i]t was tough and crowded .... [b]ut it hummed." Id.
78. See id. (noting that Sears, Roebuck and Co.'s headquarters was also lo-
cated in Lawndale, employing more than 10,000 workers). In 1973, however, Sears
moved its best paying jobs and most of its operations to Chicago's "Loop." See id.
Currently, in North Lawndale a catalogue distribution center still employs 3,000
workers, but three-fourths of these workers live outside the immediate Lawndale
vicinity. See id.
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The end of World War II sparked a national migration of fami-
lies from crowded inner cities to single family homes in the sub-
urbs. Lawndale's predominantly white population was replaced
with lower and middle income black families.7 9 This resulted in an
overall change in demographics from a black population of thir-
teen percent in 1950, to a black population of 91 percent in 1960, a
figure which remains relatively unchanged today.80 The population
of Lawndale hit an all-time high of 125,000 in 1960, but this
number has been declining ever since. 81 Most white families, and a
large percentage of middle-class black families, fled to suburbia. To
compound matters, after the 1968 riots protesting Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s assassination, Lawndale's economy took a turn for
the worse when storekeepers found themselves either burned out
or unable to get insurance. These events began a cycle of poverty
and welfare dependence that currently has over forty-five percent
of Lawndale's residents in a stranglehold. 82
In 1906, Sears, Roebuck & Company (Sears), a national re-
tailer, finished construction of its world headquarters in the middle
of Lawndale. With three million square feet of buildings on fifty-
five acres of land, the facility was the largest in the world.83 Sears
relocated most of its operations to the 110-story Sears Tower in the
"loop" section of downtown Lawndale in 1973, and then moved to a
suburban Chicago location in 1992. The void created by Sears' de-
parture in 1973 compounded Lawndale's economic woes, which
had already been hit with massive losses of population and housing
79. See id. (recalling that in 1946, North Lawndale was 64% Jewish, yet in
1950, this number fell to 42% because many Lawndale residents moved to better
neighborhoods).
80. See Longworth, supra note 75, at 1 (stating that African-American popula-
tion in Lawndale now accounts for 97% of Lawndale's total population).
81. See id. (providing that only 61,500 lived in Lawndale in 1985). Longworth
explained: "The loss has been due to not only the exodus of whites; middle-class
blacks also moved out to better neighborhoods or suburbs. The neighborhood's
change from white to black coincided exactly with the decline in North Lawndale's
economy and the loss of jobs there." Id. Longworth also added that while some
business owners moved out early and took their shops with them, "[t]he real exo-
dus took place after the riots, when store keepers either found themselves burned
out or unable to get insurance. The departure of Harvester was a milestone in the
loss of industrial jobs." Id.
82. SeeJeanette Almada, 1 0-Year Development Plan for a Sears Site in Chicago, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 9, at 5 (acknowledging joint venture in 1994 between Sears
and Shaw Co. as example of limited major residential developments underway in
Lawndale).
83. SeeJ. Linn Allen, Rejuvenation of Sears'Site May Sell Others on Inner City, CHI.
TIUB., Jan. 23, 1994, § Real Estate, at 1.
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stock.8 4  In 1987, the final time card was punched at Sears'
Lawndale facility, which employed at this time only 1,350 full-time
workers and 450 part-time employees.8 5 With Sears gone, and
much of Lawndale's businesses and housing stock shuttered, devel-
opers began to flock to Lawndale with high expectations of devel-
oping the one project that would turn local fortunes around.8 6
84. See Longworth, supra note 75, at 1 (stating that while Sears moved most of
its operations out of Lawndale, including most of its best-paying jobs, it kept its
Lawndale distribution center for its catalogues in 1985). Between 1970 and 1980,
the time period in which Sears relocated, Lawndale lost an additional 44% of its
remaining commercial jobs and 80% of its manufacturing jobs. See id.
85. David Elsner, No Surprises In Sears Closing Lawndale Plant's Workers Disheart-
ened About Future, CHI. TPB., Mar. 3, 1987, § Business, at 6 (noting that until 1974,
North Lawndale was home to Sears' headquarters and most employees who were
let go in 1987 closing of distribution center lived in North Lawndale). Residents of
Lawndale currently have a median income of $12,000 per year, roughly half that of
Chicago as a whole. See Longworth, supra note 75, at 1. Unemployment in
Lawndale is estimated at 40% to 45%. See id. (noting that while some community
leaders claim economy is improving, growing number of welfare cases, continuing
loss ofjobs, and recent industry closings suggest otherwise). Ruth Rothstein, Presi-
dent of Mt. Sinai Hospital, one of the city's few remaining big institutions, stated
that "without new jobs, the cycle of more people on welfare and deteriorating
housing situation will continue .... ." Id.
86. One development group proposed a shopping center that would require
substantial public funds to pay for items, such as a security tower with a second-
floor observation deck, 24-hour closed circuit surveillance, perimeter fencing, and
a security patrol. See David Ibata, Developer Revives Hope for N. Lawndale Mall, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 6, 1987, § Business, at 1 (estimating that proposed 100,000 square foot
project would cost approximately $9.5 million and that no guarantee of success
existed even with tax incentives and below-market loans). Matanky Reality Group
president, Barry Kreisler, stated that the envisioned high-security shopping center
not only was the only type of shopping center that could survive in the neighbor-
hood, but also "require[d] a very high level of public participation .... All this
heightened security and staffing [would have to come] at a price." Id. This
"prison-style" development was not the type of revitalization that the local commu-
nity had in mind, and the project therefore never got off the ground. See id.
Shortly thereafter, the Sears site in Lawndale became a front runner in the
race for a new National Football League stadium for the Chicago Bears. See
Uthman Muhammad, Sears and Bears, Get Together!, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.,Jan. 16, 1989,
§ Opinion, at 11 (acknowledging that proposed business/stadium complex had
potential to overcome social and economic distress prevalent in Lawndale's com-
munity). Community opposition to this proposal was strong and swift over what
was perceived as the city's attempt to displace residents while providing merely low-
paying stadium jobs. See John McCarron, More Proposals for Stadium Site Promoters,
Politicians Seek Bears, CHI. TRiB., May 5, 1987, at 3 (noting one city official as saying
Bears could move into Lawndale without disrupting or disturbing anything). To
express their concerns, local groups chartered buses and held a news conference
on the front steps of the Chicago Bears owner's estate. See id. The protesters made
it clear that any development in Lawndale was going to require input from com-
munity members, who collectively were interested in retaining and enhancing the
social character of the neighborhood through the creation of economic benefits.
See id. The Chicago Bears subsequently dropped their plans to move to Lawndale.
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B. Urban Renewal: Promise and Skepticism
The early 1990s saw a retail boom in Chicago that brought 128
new shopping centers, which contained a total of thirty-two million
square feet by 1992.87 Sensing that a retail center was on the hori-
zon for Lawndale, local residents were surprised to discover that
Sears had engaged a prominent residential/commercial developer,
Charles H. Shaw Co. (Shaw), to construct low to moderate income
housing on the former Sears site (Homan Square).SS Shaw saw this
as an opportunity to be a model for the nation as to how to deal
with the low and moderate-income housing issue.89
Local optimism, however, was soon met with strong skepticism.
Even though the local community would greatly benefit from this
new development, many residents voiced concerns that the new de-
velopment was really meant to displace current residents in ex-
change for middle and upper income residents from other
neighborhoods, a process known as "gentrification."9 0
87. See Malls Fuel Retail Space Boom: Survey Shows Heated Pace For Development
Through '92, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., May 7, 1990, § Real Estate, at 26 (commenting that,
in 1989, 33 shopping centers opened in greater Chicago metropolitan area, and 95
additional centers were scheduled to open in 1990, 1991, and 1992).
88. SeeJerry C. Davis & Maudlyne Ihejirika, Housing Project For Sears Site; Afford-
able Units on Westside Seen, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 1992, § News, at 5 (explaining
that proposed new housing development would feature two and three story homes
with approximately 24 single-family homes, townhouses, and 56 rental units). The
single-family homes and townhouses were to range from $65,000 to $90,000, and
the rental units were expected to fall within the $375 to $525 per month range. See
id.
89. See Patrick T. Reardon, Housing Development Planned On Former Sears Site,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1992, § Business, at 2 (stating that 41 acres will be used for
housing and remaining space will continue unused with possibility for industrial
development). Sears and Shaw created a non-profit partnership, West Side Afford-
able Housing Inc., for the development of this project. See id. Shaw stated that
they "may have to create some opportunities that don't exist today." Id.
It is important to note that Shaw's actions here were technically in keeping
with the original motivations behind the Environmental Justice movement, namely
to prevent environmental discrimination against minorities and poor communi-
ties. See Kibel, supra note 25, at 606 (describing intent which originally drove envi-
ronmental justice). Even though no one may have described Shaw's actions in
such a way, such a characterization is inescapable. For a further discussion of the
Environmental Justice movement, see supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
90. See Maudlyne Ihejirika, Housing Plan Divides North Lawndale, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at 33. This article quotes Reverend Floyd James, Chairman
of the Greater Lawndale Preservation Council, as saying, "I don't mind economic
and racial integration, but that doesn't happen in our communities. In our com-
munities, with gentrification, comes elimination." Id. (quoting Shaw as also stat-
ing, "It's not a question of driving low-income out. It's a question of brining in
working class-or middle class .... [i]t's to these groups enlightened self-interest
to get themselves about the business of building on the stimulus this project can
be").
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In order to be responsive to community concerns, where in the
past, other developers had not, Shaw met with over a hundred dif-
ferent stakeholder groups whose input was incorporated into the
planning process of Homan Square. The result of the community
input was a three-component development plan, incorporating
housing, commercial, and community service elements. 91
Stability of the local economic base is critical for a housing pro-
ject, such as Homan Square, to survive. 92 While stability is usually
achieved in conjunction with a large institution, such as a hospital
or a university, Homan Square will require a "luring back" of mid-
dle class residents to the community. In order to attract the types
of industry that provide neighborhood stability, Homan Square and
Lawndale need to offer a diverse and educated labor pool. If
Homan Square and Lawndale are unable to do this, then new em-
ployers will be forced to draw employment from other parts of the
91. See Allen, supra note 83, at 1. Charles Shaw noted that he spent more time
with bureaucrats and community people on the project than in any other project
in his 33 years of building experience. See id. (revealing that Shaw's greatest efforts
have been aimed at attracting business and government leaders to industrial and
office space in Lawndale). This article also emphasized that Shaw's project will be
very influential in determining whether future projects will be supported and fi-
nanced by local business and government leaders. See id. Moreover, the article
asserted:
If his development at the 55-acre former Sears headquarters complex
should succeed, it could inspire similar large-scale projects to reclaim in-
nercities all around the country. If it fails, it could be taken in Chicago
and elsewhere as further evidence that money going to innercity redevel-
opment is just dollars down the drain.
Id. The housing component is comprised of approximately 600 multi-income
units in four phases, with a majority of subsidized units for low-income renters and
purchasers alike. See id. The remaining units are being sold at "market" rates to
allow for residents whose income level would disqualify them from receiving hous-
ing subsidies. See id.
Shaw's intensive work with community leaders and neighbors illustrates the
necessity of any community's coming together to decide how a brownfields rede-
velopment will affect them. See DAvis & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 183-92 (assert-
ing that interaction between developer of brownfields and community members is
essential). This "coming together" of interests also reflects the current mindset
behind the Environmental Justice movement. See Rajzer, supra note 72 (noting
that Environmental Justice advocates desire equal partnership on every level in
making decisions which will affect their community); see also AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF
HOPE, supra note 2 (discussing community involvement in brownfields redevelop-
ment). For a further discussion of the Environmental Justice movement and the
need for community involvement in making brownfields redevelopment decisions,
see supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
92. See Allen, supra note 83, at 1 (noting Shaw's comment that "most success-
ful revitalization projects on [Homan Square] scale have been done in association
with an institution that provides a natural stabilizer and an employment base").
Shaw added that it is essential to have a business center as the foundation of the
community and its new residents. See id. "Job creation through business develop-
ment is crucial to maintaining a market for the housing." Id.
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region, leaving only the most menial positions available for the lo-
cal citizenry. Therefore, while gentrification is not the primary ob-
jective for Homan Square, Shaw has been forthright with
community leaders that the long-term success of the development
depends largely upon its ability to attract middle-class residents in
order to achieve an "economically integrated" project. 93 Shaw
hopes to achieve integration through design elements, such as sin-
gle family residences and multi-family residences interspersed on
the same street, as well as the mixture of subsidized and market rate
units discussed above.94
The commercial component for Homan Square consists of one
million square feet of office and industrial uses and will utilize ex-
isting structures on the property. The proximity of Homan Square
to the local expressway and light-rail stations gives Homan Square
an advantage over competitive sites further away from transporta-
tion corridors. Shaw hopes to attract major employers who will pro-
vide a percentage of jobs to local residents in exchange for
subsidized rent and/or HUD Enterprise Zone tax credits. 95
The community service element of Homan Square includes
amenities designed to enhance the quality of life for the residents.
It is hoped that these amenities will in turn create sustainability for
the development. These amenities include generous green areas, a
community park, a local bank branch, a family healthcare center,
an 800-officer police station, a day-care center, and job training
facilities. 96
C. Environmental Cleanup
Environmental contamination at Homan Square consisted
largely of the removal of asbestos and PCB (polychlorinated biphe-
nyls) from the old, demolished Sears catalog building. Further-
more, under the site of the former Sears Auto Center,
underground storage tanks leaked a petroleum mixture known as
B-TEX (Benzine, Toluene, Ethyl benzene, and Xylene). Remedia-
93. See id. (commenting that for residential developments such as Homan
Square to be successful, developers must draw from larger area than just North
Lawndale because not enough financially qualified buyers live in Lawndale area).
94. See id. (explaining that Shaw's plan to lure buyers to development in-
cludes landscaped open spaces, which will have picnic and play areas).
95. See Almada, supra note 82, at 5.
96. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 54, at 135-37 (noting that success of
Homan Square Project was achieved through implementation of Sears and Shaw's
three-component revitalization plan (housing, commercial development, and com-
munity services)).
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tion at this site consisted of excavation and removal of contami-
nated soils to landfills. 97
Shaw received aid in the cleanup process via a state law which
provides for the use of "risk assessments" in connection with poten-
tial groundwater contaminants. Risk-based cleanup strategists eval-
uate the level of contamination in the context of the intended use
of the property.98 Where the containment of subsurface chemicals
is achievable, and the intended use of the property is not for resi-
dential purposes, on-site treatment alternatives, such as vapor ex-
traction and soil washing, may be utilized as opposed to the
excavation and removal of the entire site.99 The availability of these
alternatives accomplishes a cost-effective remediation in the small-
est amount of time.100 The expedited confrontation of the environ-
mental issues at Homan Square prevented the expression of any
serious concern or opposition from the community. Moreover, it
was beneficial that the development's landowner was responsible,
proactive, and possessed the financial resources to achieve the
cleanup. 10 1
VI. POTENTIAL FOR NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION
As of January 1998, completed construction of Phase III of
Homan Square resulted in the creation of 347 housing units. 10 2
Unit count, however, is not the sole measure of a successful housing
development. In a national trade publication, Charles Shaw noted
that "we are not just building buildings, we are building a neighbor-
97. See id. (noting that expedited manner in which environmental problems
and concerns were addressed prevented community protest regarding potential
health risks).
98. See DAvIs & MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 276 (explaining that future ex-
pected use of brownfields property allows environmental experts to assess property
risks resulting from existing contaminants). For a further discussion of
brownfields cleanup projects, see supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
99. See id. (commmenting that brownfields cleanup levels and requirements
must also fulfill any applicable state and regional criteria present).
100. See id. (remarking that if risk-based cleanup levels are significantly higher
than required state or regional levels, then additional costs to achieve higher level
are "contrasted to the probability and cost of failing regulatory approval for the
risk-based cleanup levels").
101. See Don DeBat, Ray of Hopefor North Lawndale; Rehabilitation Planned, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, § Homelife, at 15. The author stated that "[Sears] ...
plans to contribute land and spend $30 million for architectural, planning and
other professional fees, demolition and environmental cleanup to make way for
housing." Id. (stating that Sears planned to demolish its antiquated three million
square foot catalogue building which currently remains on property).
102. See Bill Rumbler, New Homes Revitalize W. Side, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 23,
1998, § Homelife, at 1.
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hood. 103 The true measure of whether a project of this type can be
the centerpiece of a successful neighborhood revitalization is its
ability to inspire substantial private and public investment in com-
plementary projects that add to the sustainability of the community
as a whole. In this light, Homan Square has been an immense
success.
A. Small Business Initiative
The first substantial complementary investment in Homan
Square came from Chicago's Economic Development Commission
when the Commission decided that Homan Square was the right
site for a federally-backed regional Manufacturing Technology Ex-
tension Center (MTEC). 10 4 The federal government earmarked
eight million dollars, as part of President Clinton's Defense Rein-
vestment Conversion Initiative, to place a limited number of MTEC
facilities throughout the nation. 10 5 The City of Chicago and the
State of Illinois are expected in turn to provide an additional thirty-
three million dollars for operating expenses, with more funds com-
ing from private business sources. 106 The MTEC will be used to
give small and midsize businesses training and other assistance in
using the latest technology, equipment, and global operating stan-
dards. The services provided by MTEC are vital to the long-term
survival of Chicago as a manufacturing hub, and to Chicago's over-
all industrial competitiveness.
B. Local Health Services
Another tenant in the former Sears administration building is
a new health and family center, which is a collaborative effort be-
tween the Rush College of Nursing, Rush University, and the Rush
103. Dan McLeister, Infill Housing Opportunities Still Growing, 61 PROF.
BUILDER, Sept. 1996, no. 15, at 14; see also Rajzer, supra note 72 (highlighting im-
portance of community involvement in redeveloping brownfields); AUrTHETIrc
SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 2 (stating that brownfields redevelopment affects entire
community, thus mandating that community participation is essential because
community's health, safety, and stability are at issue).
104. See Allen, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that Shaw was also courting such
civic and business leaders as Lester Crown of Material Service Corp., Richard Terry
of Peoples Gas, Martin Koldyke of Chicago School Finance Authority, and various
officials of Catholic Archdiocese).
105. See id. (commenting that job creation though business development is
critical to maintaining market for new housing project).
106. See id. (quoting Shaw as saying, "Nobody is going to come out here inde-
pendently, so we've got to keep a bunch of things going at the same time").
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Primary Care Institute. 10 7 The development of the Rush Homan
Square Health Center is to improve access to cost-effective, high
quality primary and preventative health care services for all resi-
dents of Chicago's westside. With its four examination rooms, the
center is able to accommodate 13,800 office visits annually.'0 8 No
longer will residents have to take the train outside of their commu-
nities to obtain basic health care.10 9
C. Residential Rehabilitation
Two residential areas adjacent to Homan Square were the ben-
eficiaries of a 1995 sale of fifty-five million dollar bonds by the Illi-
nois Housing Development Authority. 110 One hundred buildings,
containing 1,240 units, in a ten-block area of nearby Douglas
Boulevard, are scheduled for rehabilitation with sixteen million
dollars of the bond issue."' The rehabilitation project enhanced
107. See Rush Primary Care Institute, Rush Homan Square Health Center (visited
Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.rpci.rush.edu/homan/index.htm> (explaining that
Rush Homan Square Health Center occupies approximately 2,000 square feet of
former Sears building). The Health Center was developed to provide cost-effec-
tive, quality primary, and preventative healthcare to the residents of Chicago's
westside. See id.
108. See id. (providing that Rush Homan Square Health Center is staffed by
family medicine physician, general internist, obstetrician/gynecologist, and three
nurse practitioners, thus enabling Health Center to deal with any health situation
that is customarily handled by "family doctors"). Services provided to the commu-
nity by the Health Center include immunizations, pre and postnatal care, and
treatment for acute and chronic illnesses, such as tuberculosis, HIV, breast cancer,
and prostate cancer. See id. The Health Center has thus proven to be a vital asset
to the community. See id.
109. See Rich Hein, Residents Fear Being Priced Out of the Area, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1994, § Sunday News, at 21 (remarking that development such as Rush
Homan Square Health Center is crucial to Lawndale's revival). Chicago developer
Jesse Miller stated, referring to projects such as the Health Center, "We can't move
the community forwards with only low income housing, low income residents and
low income jobs . . . [wie need a mixture .... Id.
The Homan Square project as a whole also represents an important facet of
brownfields redevelopment: ceasing the development of greenfields and prevent-
ing urban sprawl. People will remain in their communities and utilize existing
structures rather than creating entirely new ones outside the city limits. For a fur-
ther discussion of greenfields and urban sprawl, see supra notes 29 and 31 and
accompanying text.
110. See Lou Ortiz & Maudlyne Ihejirika, North Lawndale Wins Funds to Mend
Rental Housing, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, § News, at 4 (noting that majority of
proceeds will go to refinancing of mortgages for five partnerships that own build-
ings in Lawndale).
111. See id. (commenting that residents of Lawndale had mixed emotions
about infusion of money into their neighborhood because many feel what is
needed is more affordable housing rather than rehabbing of subsidized rental
units).
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the living conditions of over 3,800 residents.112 Another three mil-
lion dollars was allocated towards establishing Chicago's fifth Strate-
gic Neighborhood Action Plan Program (SNAPP) district.113 This
program provides funds for the rehabilitation of multi-family hous-
ing, landscapes, street improvements, and new building facades
along the business district.
D. Private Commercial Development
The commercial development in Lawndale, motivated by
Homan Square, spawned an 80,000 square foot shopping center
which features a 50,000 square foot supermarket, a commodity that
has been absent from Lawndale for over four decades. This retail
project cost $38 million to construct and created 200 local jobs.
Furthermore, in another area of Lawndale, a local print shop that
was considering relocating chose instead to remain in Lawndale to
expand its operations. This will provide 200 additionaljobs. Lastly,
still in the planning stages is a $150 million television studio com-
plex, which will be located on a former illegal dump site in
Lawndale. Upon completion, this facility will add 200 more jobs to
the bustling local economy.
In total, the fifty million dollars spent on creating and develop-
ing Homan Square inspired developers to spend another $200 mil-
lion on complementary development in the Lawndale area. This
complementary development created over 600 new jobs in
Lawndale and added low to middle income housing stock. In the
words of a local developer who saw many projects fail in the 1980s,
"there was nothing else going on in the community at the time that
impressed potential store owners, now with the Homan Square pro-
ject and the other development activities, [investors] are taking a
new look at [Lawndale]. '"14
112. See id. (stating that funds would dramatically improve Lawndale, which at
time was filled with empty lots, burned-out buildings and 45% unemployment of
its residents).
113. See id. (recalling how Lawndale once used to be home to corporate em-
ployers, such as Sears, Coca-Cola and Aldens during 1950s).
114. Flynn McRoberts, $51 Million 'Phoenix' Seen In North Lawndale, CHI. TRJB.,
Feb. 1, 1995, § News, at 1 (noting optimistic attitude that development and success
of Homan Square will bring more projects, such as shopping centers, to
Lawndale). McRoberts further stated, "Lawndale developers and residents hope
this will provide the engine to rebuild a community long equated with urban
plight." Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A 1997 urban development study indicated that brownfields
development deals do not fail because of environmental costs or
fears regarding potential liability.115 Rather, the primary factor for
failure involved non-environmental factors, such as local circum-
stances, market demand for the product, and extraordinary non-
environmental costs. 116 Homan Square stands as a symbol of what
can be achieved when divergent interests come together to discuss
their collective wants, desires, risks, and rewards in terms that are
both flexible and realistic. Brownfields development has the poten-
tial to unite economic and environmental justice interests in the
common goal of neighborhood revitalization through the establish-
ment of clear and focused goals with quantifiable environmental
cleanup costs. 1 17
In Lawndale, Shaw was responsive to community concerns re-
garding job creation and fears of gentrification. In turn, Shaw ar-
ticulated what was necessary to construct a viable development that
would sustain itself over time, namely, a project with the capability
of attracting middle class residents and national commercial ten-
ants. Compromises were reached on many points to provide for
pecuniary gain and community prosperity. Therefore, by including
local interests in the planning stages and clearly defining the goals
of both sides, the Homan Square project achieved the economic
revitalization of a declining community while providing significant
benefits to its residents, many of whom are inhabitants of the new
project.
115. See Christopher Walker et al., THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
AND REGULATION ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, exec. sum. (Urban Inst. et al., 1997)
(explaining that vital dimensions of project include broad market, legal and regu-
latory context, specific aspects of state and local policies, and site characteristics).
This section of the study also charted factors which influence redevelopment pro-
ject outcomes and the characteristics of the factors' variations. See id. These fac-
tors and variations included relationships such as preservation and development
limits in comparison with the scope of architectural preservation and green space
creation and maintenance requirements. See id.
116. See id. ("The lists of actors, stages in the redevelopment process, and fac-
tors influencing redevelopment outcomes . . . imply a lengthy inventory of data
items, most of which are quantifiable, in theory.").
117. For a further discussion of Environmental Justice and the need to unite
opposing interests to achieve common goals when redeveloping brownfields, see
supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
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